Wyner's wiretap channel is extended to parallel broadcast channels and fading channels with multiple receivers. In the first part of the paper, we consider the setup of parallel broadcast channels with one sender, multiple intended receivers, and one eavesdropper. We study the situations where the sender broadcasts either a common message or independent messages to the intended receivers. We derive upper and lower bounds on the common-messagesecrecy capacity, which coincide when the users are reversely degraded. For the case of independent messages we establish the secrecy sum-capacity when the users are reversely degraded.
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of emerging applications require a "key distribution mechanism" to selectively broadcast confidential messages to intended receivers. For example in pay TV systems, a content provider wishes to selectively broadcast a certain program to a subset of customers who have subscribed to it. An online key distribution mechanism would allow the service provider to distribute a decryption key to these intended receivers while securing it from potential eavesdroppers. The program could then be encrypted via standard cryptographic protocols, so that only users who have access to the decryption key could view it. Indeed, in the absence of such a mechanism, current solutions rely on variants of traditional public key cryptography (see, e.g., [1] ) and are vulnerable to attacks such as piracy [2] .
An information theoretic framework for perfect secrecy was developed by Shannon [3] , and the problem of broadcasting confidential messages was originally formulated by Wyner [4] . Wyner considered a special broadcast channel (also known as the wiretap channel): one sender, an intended receiver, and one eavesdropper. He characterized the tradeoff between the rate to the intended receiver and the equivocation at the eavesdropper when the eavesdropper has a degraded channel compared to the intended receiver. This formulation has been generalized for non-degraded broadcast channels in [5] , and applied to Gaussian channels in [6] .
While the results for wire-tap channels are rather surprising in that they show that it is possible to achieve a positive rate while keeping the eavesdropper in near-perfect equivocation, they also provide some disappointing facts for degraded channels, such as Gaussian [6] . First, the secrecy capacity is positive only if the eavesdropper is noisier than the intended receiver. This may not be the case in practice. Second, in the limit of high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), the secrecy capacity approaches a constant and does not exhibit a logarithmic growth with power. Thus, physical layer secrecy comes at a price in throughput and this may have prompted many practical cryptographic solutions to be based upon other notions of security, such as computational security [1] . Note, however, that such solutions require an off-line key distribution mechanism which may not be practical in emerging applications.
The wiretap channel has received renewed interest in some recent works that consider a wireless environment. There the eavesdropper is not always stronger than the intended receivers due to time variations in channel gains. These variations in turn can be exploited to communicate securely by transmitting to the receivers that have a strong channel. Such coding strategies may yield a practical approach for secure communication without an off-line key agreement.
In the present work we extend Wyner's wiretap channel to parallel broadcast channels with one sender, multiple intended receivers, and one eavesdropper. We consider two situations: all intended receivers get a common message or independent messages. We first derive upper and lower bounds on the commonmessage-secrecy-capacity. These bounds coincide when the users are reversely degraded. Perhaps the main observation is that, to achieve the common message capacity, independent codebooks are used on each parallel channel, and each receiver jointly decodes its received sequences. Next, we consider the case where the intended receivers get independent messages. We establish the secrecy capacity for the reversely degraded case. The achievable scheme is simple: transmit to the strongest user on each parallel channel and use independent codebooks across the channels. Our results for the parallel broadcast channels can be viewed as generalizations of the results in [7] which considers a similar setup without the presence of an eavesdropper.
Our study on parallel channels provides insights to the problem of broadcasting confidential messages over fading channels. In the second part of the paper we consider an i.i.d. fading model. We assume the intended receivers' channel state information (CSI) is revealed to all communicating parties (including the eavesdropper), while the eavesdropper's channel gains are revealed only to her.
We first examine the case when a common message needs to be delivered to all intended receivers in the presence of potential eavesdroppers. We refer to this problem as secure multicasting. We present a scheme that exploits CSI at the transmitter and achieves a rate that does not decay to zero with increasing number of receivers. Note that, without a secrecy constraint, transmitter CSI appears to be of little value for multicasting over ergodic channels. Indeed the capacity appears to be not too far from the maximum achievable rate with a flat power allocation scheme. The secrecy constraint adds a new twist to the multicasting problem as it requires to consider protocols that exploit transmitter CSI.
For the case of independent messages, we consider an opportunistic scheme that selects the user with the strongest channel at each time. We use Gaussian wiretap codebooks for each intended receiver and show that this scheme achieves the sum capacity in the limit of large number of receivers. Our results can be interpreted as the wiretap analog of the multiuser diversity results in settings without secrecy constraint (see, e.g., [8] ).
In related works, the Gaussian wiretap channel was extended to parallel channels in [9] . More recently, the case of discrete memoryless parallel channels with one receiver and one eavesdropper has been studied in [10] , [11] . The wiretap setting has been also studied for fading channels in [12] - [14] . All these works consider the setup of one sender, one receiver, and one eavesdropper.
There is also a vast literature on multiuser diversity in broadcast channels with independent messages starting from the results in [15] , [16] . However, to the best of our knowledge, the present work is the first to consider the impact of multiuser diversity on secrecy systems. As discussed before, the case of a common message has received much less attention in the literature. The problem of transmitting a common message on parallel channels has been studied in [7] , [17] but we are not aware of a general treatment of this problem for fading channels (without an eavesdropper). We hope that the secrecy constraint creates renewed interest in the study of common message broadcast problems, given its application to key distribution.
We use the following notation. Upper case letters are used for random variables and the lower case for their realizations. The notation s n denotes a vector of length n. Vector quantities related to the eavesdropper have a subscript e, e.g., y n e , while the ones of the intended receivers are subscripted by the user number, e.g., y n i . We use the subscript i to index the receivers and the subscript j to index the channels. We use
1. An example of reversely degraded parallel channel in Definition 2 with one sender, K = 2 users, one eavesdropper, and M = 3 channels.
the letter t to denote the discrete time index. If there is an ordering of users on a given channel, the strongest user on channel j will be denoted by π j . The set of ordered users on channel j is denoted as π j (1), π j (2), . . . We use the notation p(X j ) to denote the probability mass function of random variable X j .
II. PARALLEL CHANNELS: MODEL In our setup, there are M parallel channels for communication, one sender, K intended receivers, and one eavesdropper.
Definition 1 (Product Broadcast Channel): An (M, K) product broadcast channel consists of one sender, K receivers, one eavesdropper, and M channels. The channels have finite input and output alphabets, are memoryless and independent of each other, and are characterized by their transition probabilities given by
(1) for j = 1, 2, . . . , M, where x n j = x j (1), x j (2), . . . , x j (n) denotes the sequence of symbols transmitted on channel j, and where y n ij = y ij (1), y ij (2), . . . , y ij (n) denotes the sequence of symbols received by user i on channel j from time 1 up to n. The alphabets of the X j 's and Y ij 's are denoted by X and Y respectively.
Of particular interest is a special class of reversely degraded broadcast channels. Definition 2 (Reversely Degraded Broadcast Channel): An (M, K) reversely degraded broadcast channel is an (M, K) product broadcast channel, where each of the M parallel channels is degraded in a certain order. For some permutation π j (1), π j (2), . . . π j (K + 1) of the set {1, 2, . . . , K, e} of the K + 1-receivers,
Remark 1: Note that in Definition 2 the order of degradation can be different across the channels, so the overall channel may not be degraded. An example of reversely degraded parallel channel is shown in Fig 1. Also, on any parallel channels component, the K users and the eavesdropper are physically degraded. Our capacity results will, however, only depend on the marginal distribution of receivers on each channel (see Fact 1 below). Accordingly, these results also hold for a larger class of channels where receivers on each channel are stochastically degraded.
III. PARALLEL CHANNELS: COMMON MESSAGE
In this section we consider the case where all the receivers are interested in only a common message. This common message must be protected from the eavesdropper in the sense described below.
Definition 3: A (n, 2 nR ) code consists of a message set W = {1, 2, . . .
from the message set to the codewords for the M channels, and a decoder
→ W for i = 1, 2, . . . K at each receiver. We denote the message estimate at decoder i byŴ i . A common-message-secrecy-rate R is achievable if, for any ε > 0, there exists a length n code such that Pr(W =Ŵ i ) ≤ ε for i = 1, 2, . . . K, while
The common-message-secrecy-capacity is the supremum over all achievable rates. Remark 2: Wyner's formulation considers the rate-equivocation region (R, R e ) with 1 n H(W ) ≥ R and
The secrecy-capacity constitutes the special case when R = R e . In the key-distribution application of interest, the key length is limited by the equivocation rate R e -the minimum number of bits the eavesdropper needs to guess to decode the message. Accordingly, the secrecy capacity is of primary interest.
A. Main Results
Our main result is the characterization of upper and lower bounds on the common-message-secrecycapacity for the product channel model (1) . The bounds coincide for the reversely degraded model.
To state our upper bound we introduce the following additional notation. For any j = 1, 2, . . . , M,
denote the cartesian product of these sets across the channels.
Lemma 1 (Upper Bound): For the product broadcast channel model in Definition 1, an upper bound on the secrecy capacity is given by
where the first minimum is over all the joint distributions
Lemma 2 (Lower Bound):
An achievable common-message-secrecy-rate for the product broadcast channel model Definition 1 is
The random variables U 1 , U 2 , . . . U M are independent over some alphabet U, and each f j : U → X , j = 1, . . . , M is a (possibly stochastic 2 ) mapping from the U to X . Our upper and lower bounds coincide for the case of reversely degraded product channels. Theorem 1: The common-message-secrecy-capacity for the reversely degraded channel model in Definition 2 is given by
Note that the expression in (5) is evaluated for the joint distribution induced by the reversely degraded channel. This distribution is the worst-case distribution in the set P in (3). Remark 3: Our achievable rate expression in (4) involves optimization over the auxiliary random variables U j and the stochastic mappings f j (·). As noted in [5] , the expression I(U j ; Y ij ) − I(U j ; Y ej ) is in general not convex in p(X j |U j ), hence the optimal f j (·) need not be deterministic functions. However, for the special reversely degraded case in Theorem 1, the choice X j = U j is optimal (see Section III-D). 1 
{v}
+ stands for max{0, v}. 2 For each u ∈ Uj, a stochastic mapping fj : U → X produces a random element in X .
The proof of the upper bound in Lemma 1 is a rather straightforward extension of Wyner's converse for the single user wiretap channel. The achievability proof in Lemma 2 is more interesting. When specialized to the case of no eavesdropper, it provides a different capacity achieving scheme than the one considered in [7] .
B. Upper Bound
Fact 1: The common-message-secrecy-capacity for the wiretap channel depends only on the marginal (1) and not on the joint distribution p(Y 1j , Y 2j , . . . , Y Kj |X j ) for each j = 1, 2, . . . , M. The proof of this fact is essentially the same as the proof for broadcast channels without secrecy constraint (see, e.g., [5] ).
The following property will be used in the upper bound derivation but, also, in other subsequent proofs. Fact 2: For any random variables X, Y , and Z the quantity I(X; Y |Z) is concave in p(X). The proof is implicit in the arguments in [18] . We provide it in Appendix I for completeness.
Suppose there exists a sequence of (n, 2 nR ) codes such that, for every ε > 0, as n → ∞
We first note that from Fano's Lemma we have
Combining (6) and (7) we have, for all i = 1, 2, . . . K and ε = ε +
where (8) follows from the fact that
) form a Markov chain, and (9) holds because the parallel channels are mutually independent in (1) so that
We now upper bound each term in the summation (10) . We have
where (11) follows from the fact that the channel is memoryless,and (13) is obtained by defining Q to be a (time-sharing) random variable uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , n} independent of everything else. The random variables (X j , Y ij , Y ej ) are such that, conditioned on Q = k, they have the same joint distribution as
Finally (14) follows from the fact that the mutual information is concave with respect to the input distribution p(X j ) as stated in Fact 2.
Combining (14) and (9) we have
The above bound (16) depends on the joint distribution across the channels. Accordingly, we tighten the upper bound by considering the worst distribution in P = P 1 × P 2 × . . . × P M which gives
C. Lower Bound
We first informally present the main ideas in our achievability scheme. We construct M independent codebooks, one for each channel, denoted as C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C M . The structure of the codebooks is shown in Fig. 2 . Each C j has 2 n(R+I(U j ;Y ej )) codewords, randomly partitioned into 2 nR message bins -there are 2 nI(U j ;Y ej ) codewords per bin. Given a message W , the encoder selects M codewords as follows. On channel j, it looks into the bin corresponding to message W in C j and randomly selects a codeword in this bin. Each intended receiver attempts to find a message that is jointly typical with its received sequences. An appropriate choice of R guarantees successful decoding with high probability for each intended receiver, and near perfect equivocation at the eavesdropper.
We now provide a formal description of our coding scheme. Fix the distributions p(U 1 ), p(U 2 ), . . . , p(U M ) and the (possibly stochastic) functions f 1 (·), . . . , f M (·). Let ε E and ε R be positive constants, to be quantified later. With respect to these quantities, define
Msg. 2 bin Fig. 2 . Structure of the codebooks in our coding scheme for the case of two parallel channels. Each codebook has 2 nR message bins and Qj ≈ 2 n(I(U j ;Y ej )) codewords per message bin. Thus the size of bins depends on the mutual information of the eavesdropper on the corresponding channel. This flexible binning enables to confuse the eavesdropper on each channel. Note that C1 and C2 above have the same number of rows but different number of columns. The codewords for message w k in Cj are labeled as u
In what follows, whenever typicality is mentioned it is intended to be ε−weak typicality (see, e.g., [19] ). The set T (U j ) denotes the set of all sequences that are typical with respect to distribution p(U j ) and the set T (X j , U j ) denotes the set of all jointly typical sequences (x n j , u n j ) with respect to the distribution p(X j , U j ). T u n j (X j |U j ) denotes the set of all sequences x n j conditionally typical with respect to a given sequence u n j according to p(X j |U j ).
1) Codebook Generation:
• Codebook C j for j = 1, 2, . . . , M has a total of M j = 2 n(R+R ej ) length n codeword sequences. Each sequence is selected uniformly and independently from the set T (U j ).
• We randomly partition the M j sequences into 2 nR message bins so that there are Q j = 2 nR ej codewords per bin.
• The set of codewords associated with bin w in codebook C j is denoted as
Note that C j = 2 nR w=1 C j (w) is the codebook on channel j. 2) Encoding: To encode message w, the encoder randomly and uniformly selects a codeword in the set C j (w) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ M. Specifically,
where k j is selected independently and uniformly from the set {1, 2, . . .
• The transmitted sequence on channel j is denoted by
is obtained by applying the (possibly stochastic) function f j (·) on the t th element of the codeword u n jk j (w). 3) Decoding: Receiver i, based on its observations (y n i1 , y n i2 , . . . , y n iM ) from the M parallel channels, declares message w according to the following rule.
• Let S i = {j|1 ≤ j ≤ M, I(U j ; Y ij ) > I(U j ; Y ej )} denote the set of channels where receiver i has larger mutual information than the eavesdropper. The receiver only considers the outputs y n ij from these channels.
• Receiver i searches for a message w such that, for each j ∈ S i , there is an index l j such that (u
If a unique w has this property, the receiver declares it as the transmitted message. Otherwise, the receiver declares an arbitrary message.
4) Error Probability:
We show that, averaged over the ensemble of codebooks, the error probability is smaller than a constant ε (to be specified), which approaches zero as n → ∞. This demonstrates the existence of a codebook with error probability less than ε . We do the analysis for user i and, without loss of generality, assume that message w 1 is transmitted.
• False Reject Event: Let E c 1j be the event {(U
by construction and Y ij is obtained by passing U j through a DMC, it follows that Pr(E c 1j ) ≤ δ, where δ → 0 as ε → 0. Accordingly if E c 1 denotes the event that message w 1 does not appear typical, then we have
• False Accept Event: As before, let S i ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , M} denote the subset of channels for which
In what follows the index j will only refer to channels in S i . Let E rj denote the event that there is a codeword in the set C j (w r ) (r > 1) typical with Y n ij . Also let E r be the event that message w r has a codeword typical on every channel.
where the last inequality follows since Q j = 2 n(I(U j ;Y ej )−ε F ) . Finally, the probability of E r can be computed as
where (21) follows by independence of codebooks and channels. The probability of false accept event E F is then given by
which vanishes with increasing n for any ε R and ε F that satisfy the relation ε R > Mε F − 3Mδ > 0. The probability of error averaged over the ensemble of codebooks is less than ε = max Mδ, 2 −n(3M δ−M ε F +ε R ) . This demonstrates the existence of a codebook with error probability less than ε .
5) Secrecy Analysis:
We now bound the equivocation at the eavesdropper for a typical code in the ensemble. Informally, since the codebook C j has 2 n(I(U j ;Y ej )−ε F ) codewords per bin, the eavesdropper's equivocation is near perfect when observing the output of channel j, i.e., 1 n I(W ; Y n ej ) ≤ ε F for some ε F (to be specified) such that ε F → 0 as ε F → 0. Since we are sending the same message on each of the M channels, the eavesdropper can potentially reduce the equivocation by combining the channel outputs. However in doing so, his equivocation reduces by at most Mε F since the codewords on each channel are independently selected. 3 The following Lemma is proved in Appendix II. Lemma 3: A typical code from the ensemble in our achievability scheme satisfies the following: For any j = 1, 2, . . . M, we have
Using the above lemma we now upper bound the mutual information at the eavesdropper as
where
Hence the normalized mutual information increases only by a fixed amount due to observations on multiple channels. By choosing ε in (2) to equal Mε F , we satisfy the secrecy constraint.
D. Capacity Result of Theorem 1
The result of Theorem 1 follows directly from Lemma 1 and 2. For the reversely degraded broadcast channel we have, for all i and j, that either
which coincides with our achievable rate in (4) when we choose U j = X j . As a special case of Theorem 1, we have the following corollary for the case of one receiver and one eavesdropper.
Corollary 1 (Single User case): Consider the reversely degraded parallel channels in Definition 2 with one receiver and one eavesdropper. The secrecy capacity is given by Fig. 3 . Two coding schemes for common message transmission on proposed channels. The top figure shows the scheme proposed in Theorem 1. It achieves the common message capacity. In this scheme we use independent codebooks on each parallel channel. This allows us to separately bin on each channel. The lower figure shows the scheme that uses a single codebook. While this scheme is optimal when there is no eavesdropper [7] , it is suboptimal in our setup. This drawback of this scheme is that because of the single codebook, one cannot separately bin for each channel.
Remark 4:
The single user result admits a simple coding scheme. Split the message W into M submessages W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W M and independently encode and decode message W j on channel j with a codebook of rate R j = I(X j ; Y j |Y ej ). With multiple receivers however, this simple scheme is limited by the worst user on each parallel channel and does not achieve the secrecy capacity.
E. Sub-optimality of a Single Codebook scheme
The capacity of common message for reversely degraded broadcast channels in Definition 2 without the secrecy constraint is [7] 
The achievability scheme in (27) uses a single codebook with codewords of dimension M × n. The j th component of the codeword is a length n sequence sampled from an i.i.d. p(X j ) distribution and is transmitted on channel j.
Our achievable scheme is different from this single codebook scheme since we use independent codebooks on each parallel channel. Note that this distinction is important in achieving the secrecy capacity in Theorem 1. The distinction between these schemes is shown in Fig. 3 . An achievable rate using the single-codebook scheme in our setup is
Note that, in general, the rate (28) is smaller than (5). 4 The intuition behind this is that, by using an independent codebook on each parallel channel, it is possibly to separately tune the bin size on each channel according to the degradation of the eavesdropper. Finally note that our proposed scheme also provides an alternative way to [7] to achieve the common message capacity in the absence of an eavesdropper.
F. Gaussian Channels
We consider the Gaussian channel model where
with Z ij ∼ N (0, σ 2 ij ) and Z ej ∼ N (0, σ 2 ej ). All these noise variables are assumed independent. We also impose an average power constraint E[
The common-message-secrecy-capacity for the Gaussian parallel broadcast channel in (29) is
where F is the set of all feasible power allocations that satisfy M j=1 P j ≤ P . To prove Corollary 2, first observe that the channel in (29) has the same capacity as the corresponding reversely degraded broadcast channel (see Fact 1) given by the following model: on channel j, let π j (1), . . . , π j (K + 1) denote set of intended receivers and eavesdropper ordered from the strongest to the weakest. For each 0 ≤ k ≤ K, the channel for user
Since I(X j ;Ŷ ij |Ŷ ej ) is a continuous and concave function in p(X) (see Fact 2), we use discretization arguments (see, e.g., Ch. 7 in [20] ) to extend Theorem 1 to the Gaussian case
Now observe that max p(X j ),E[X 2 j ]≤P j I(X j ;Ŷ ij |Ŷ ej ) denotes the capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel [6] . Accordingly we have
One then deduces (30).
IV. PARALLEL CHANNELS: INDEPENDENT MESSAGES We consider the case of M parallel channels, one eavesdropper and K receivers, each interested in an independent message. Each such message must be protected from the eavesdropper. We now define the achievable rate for the case of independent messages. Definition 4 (Length n Code): A (2 nR 1 , 2 nR 2 , . . . , 2 nR K , n) code for the product broadcast wiretap channel in Definition 1 consists of a mapping ω n :
from the messages of the K users to the M channel inputs and K decoding functions φ i,n :
at each intended receiver. We denote the message estimate at decoder i byŴ i . A perfect-secrecy-rate tuple (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R K ) is achievable if, for every ε > 0, there is a length n code such that Pr(W i =Ŵ i ) ≤ ε for all i = 1, 2, . . . , K, and such that the following condition is satisfied
The secrecy-sum-capacity C sum K,M is the supremum of R 1 + R 2 + . . . + R K over the achievable rate tuples (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R K ).
Remark 5:
are revealed to the eavesdropper. It may be possible to increase the secrecy rate by exploiting the fact that the eavesdropper does not have access to other messages. This is not considered in the present paper.
A. Main Results
Our main result is an expression for the secrecy-sum-capacity for the reversely degraded broadcast channel in Definition 2.
Theorem 2: Let π j denote the strongest user on channel j. The secrecy-sum-capacity for the reversely broadcast channel is given by
Furthermore, the expression in (34) is an upper bound on the secrecy-sum-capacity when only the intended users are reversely degraded -but the set of receivers together with the eavesdropper is not degraded. The remainder of this section will be devoted to the proof of Theorem 2 and some discussion.
B. Proof of Upper Bound in Theorem 2
We establish the upper bound in Theorem 2. Suppose a genie provides the output of the strongest receiver, π j , to all other receivers on each channel, i.e., on channel j the output Y ). Clearly, such a genie aided channel can only have a sum capacity larger than the original channel. Since all receivers are identical, to compute the sum capacity it suffices to consider the situation with one sender, one receiver, and one eavesdropper.
Lemma 4: The secrecy-sum-capacity in Theorem 2 is upper bounded by the secrecy capacity of the genie aided channel, i.e., C sum K,M ≤ C GenieAided . Proof: Suppose that a secrecy rate point (R 1 , R 2 , . . . R K ) is achievable for the K user channel in Theorem 2 and let the messages be denoted as (W 1 , W 2 , . . . W K ). This implies that, for any ε > 0 and n large enough, there is a length n code such that Pr(Ŵ i = W i ) ≤ ε for i = 1, 2, . . . , K, and such that
We now show that a rate of (
) is achievable on the genie aided channel. First, note that any message that is correctly decoded on the original channel is also correctly decoded by user 1 on the genie aided channel. It remains to bound the equivocation on the genie aided channel when the message to receiver 1 is W = (W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W K ). We have
where the last step follows from (35). Since ε is arbitrary, this establishes the claim.
Lemma 5:
The secrecy capacity of the genie aided channel is
Proof: Since all receivers are identical on the genie aided channel, this Lemma is a direct consequence of Corollary 1 when specialized to the case of K = 1 receiver.
Remark 6: The upper bound continues to hold even if the eavesdroppers channel is not ordered with respect to the intended receivers. In general, following Lemma 1, the upper bound can be tightened by considering, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ M, the worst joint distribution p (Y π j , Y ej |X j ) among all joint distributions with the same marginal distribution as p(Y π j |X j ) and p(Y ej |X j ), yielding
C. Achievability Scheme Our achievability scheme for Theorem 2 requires the receivers and the eavesdropper to be reversely degraded. We only send information intended to the strongest user, i.e., only user π j on channel j can decode. It follows from the result of the wiretap channel [4] that a rate of R j = max p(X j ) I(X j ; Y π j |Y e j ) is achievable on channel j. Accordingly the total sum rate of j R j is achievable which is the capacity expression.
Remark 7: The "opportunistic transmission" strategy in Theorem 2 has been previously observed in the absence of an eavesdropper [15] , [16] in the context of fading channels. Hence our result states that the optimality of opportunistic transmission also holds in the presence of an eavesdropper. Our converse technique, when applied to the case of no eavesdropper, also provides a simpler argument for the optimality of opportunistic transmission studied in [15] , [16] .
D. Gaussian Channels
Theorem 2 can be extended to the case of Gaussian parallel channels. Let σ 2 π j denote the noise variance of the strongest user on channel j. Then the secrecy-sum-capacity is given by
where the maximization is over all power allocations satisfying M j=1 P j ≤ P . The achievability follows by using independent Gaussian wiretap codebooks on each channel and only considering the strongest user on each channel. For the upper bound we have to show that Gaussian inputs are optimal in the capacity expression in Theorem 2. The justifications are the same as in the common message case in Section III-F.
V. FADING CHANNELS
The second part of this paper considers wireless fading channels. The case of one receiver and one eavesdropper has been recently studied in a number of recent works [10] - [14] , [21] . The proposed schemes adapt the transmission power and/or rate depending on the instantaneous channel conditions. The time varying nature of the fading channel enables secure transmission even when the eavesdropper has an average channel stronger than that of the intended receiver.
To the best of our knowledge, the above works do not consider secure transmission to multiple receivers in a wireless fading environment. We first consider the case when a common message has to be delivered to a set of intended receivers. Next, we consider the case when each receiver obtains an independent message. For this setting, we present a scheme based on multiuser diversity that achieves the sum capacity in the limit of a large number of receivers.
A. Channel Model
A block fading channel model for a system with one sender, K receivers, and one eavesdropper is of the form
where i denotes the index of the receiver and t denotes the time index. The vectors z i , x, y i are T dimensional complex valued vectors, where T denotes the coherence period of the channel. The channel coefficients h i (t) are constant over a block of T symbols and change independently over the blocks.
In our analysis we focus only on the fast-fading scenario, i.e., T = 1. Using interleaved codebooks we can realize the fast-fading case even when T > 1. The fast-fading channel model is of the form
where the h i (t)'s are sampled independently from CN (0, µ i ) distribution and all the noise variables are sampled independently according to CN (0, 1). The input satisfies an average power constraint
Throughout, we assume the h i (t)'s to be revealed to the transmitter, the K intended receivers and the eavesdropper in a causal manner. Implicitly we assume that there is an authenticated public feedback link from the receivers to the transmitter. The channel coefficients of the eavesdropper {h e (t)} 1≤t≤n are only known to the eavesdropper. The transmitter and the intended receivers only have statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper's channel gains.
Remark 8: In our setup we are assuming only one eavesdropper. Note however that the equivocation term depends only on the statistics of H e (t) and not on the realization of h e (t). Accordingly the number of eavesdroppers does not matter as long as they are statistically equivalent and do not collude.
VI. FADING CHANNELS: COMMON MESSAGE
Secure multicasting refers to the case when each receiver is only interested in a common message. The transmitter exploits the channel knowledge of intended receivers to selectively broadcast the message to these receivers, while the eavesdropper remains ignorant of the message. Note that without the secrecy constraint, a non adaptive scheme such as the one that does a flat power allocation with no transmitter CSI, appears to be not too far from the optimal. In contrast such schemes reveal the message to an eavesdropper with a channel statistically equivalent to some intended receiver.
Perhaps, an interesting question is the scaling of the secrecy capacity with the number of receivers. Does the capacity decay to zero with the number of receivers? Note that the scheme that consists in sending information only when all the users have a strong channel performs poorly. Since the channel gains across the users are independent, the achievable rate decays to zero exponentially in the number of users.
An obvious upper bound is the secrecy capacity with a single receiver. Accordingly, the best we hope for is that the common message secrecy-capacity is a constant, independent of the number of intended receivers. In what follows, we present a coding scheme whose achievable rate is also a constant, independent of the number of intended receivers. While our proposed scheme provides optimal scaling, the precise value of the constant remains an open problem.
We now provide a formal definition of the common-message-secrecy-capacity. Definition 5: A (n, 2 nR ) code for the channel consists of an encoding function which is a mapping from the message w ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2 nR } to transmitted symbols x(t) = ω t (w; h 
A. Main Results
Our main result is an achievable rate for the common-message-secrecy-rate to K receivers. Theorem 3: An achievable common-message-secrecy-rate for the channel model (40) is given by Note that the achievable rate in (42) and (43) does not depend on the number of receivers. Accordingly, we do not subscript the rate by K. That the capacity does not decay with the number of receivers is the best scaling of the capacity with the number of receivers that one can expect.
The "interesting" part of our achievability rate (42) is the {·} + inside the expectation. This is essentially a consequence of the multiple codebook scheme we presented for the parallel channel case in Section III.
Our approach to establish the achievability of (42) is to decompose the fading channel into a set of parallel channels and invoke Lemma 2 for the probabilistic extension of the parallel broadcast channel.
B. Achievability Scheme
First we consider the following probabilistic extension of the parallel broadcast channel [16] : At each time, only one of the parallel channel operates and channel j is selected with a probability p j , independent of all other times. Also suppose that there is a total power constraint P on the input. A straightforward extension of Lemma 2 provides the following achievable rate
where U 1 , U 2 , . . . U M are auxiliary random variables and the maximum is over the product distribution p(U 1 )p(U 2 ) . . . p(U M ) and the stochastic mappings
Next, we map the fading channel (40) into a set of parallel channels and invoke the achievable rate (44). However, we need to resolve the technicality in that the fading channel has continuous valued fading coefficients, while the rate expression in (44) is only for a finite number of parallel channels. Following [22] , our approach is to discretize the continuous valued coefficients and thus create parallel channels, one for each quantized state. The number of parallel channels increases as the quantization becomes finer. In what follows we only quantize the magnitude of the fading coefficients. The receiver can always rotate the phase, so it plays no part.
We quantize the channel gains into one of the q values:
. When in state l, the receiver's channel gain is pessimistically discretized to √ A l . Since there are K independent users, there are a total of M = q K possible super-states, which we number as S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S M . Denote the quantized gain of user i in S j by the double subscript S ij . Let p(S j ) denote the probability of state S j . Also let p i (A l ) be the probability that a user i is in state l i.e.,
In super-state S j , the channel of user i and the eavesdropper are y ij (t) = S ij x(t) + z i (t), y el (t) = H e (t)x(t) + z e (t).
By selecting U j ∼ CN (0, P ) and X j = U j , the argument in the summation in (44) (with the eavesdropper output (Y el , H e )) is
Substituting in (44), we have that the following rate is achievable
where the second equality follows from rewriting the summation over the states of each individual user. As q → ∞, the above sum converges to
yielding (42). Remark 9: The scheme presented above requires q K codebooks, where q is the number of quantization bins. A different decomposition which requires only 2 K codebooks and provides the same achievable rate is presented in Appendix III. This scheme can be implemented in practice with an outer erasure code and an inner wiretap code, as discussed in [21] .
VII. FADING CHANNELS: INDEPENDENT MESSAGES
We consider the case where each receiver wants an independent message. We will only focus on the sum rate of the system. This scenario has been widely studied in conventional systems (i.e., without a secrecy constraint) where the transmitter CSI provides dramatic gains (see e.g., [15] , [16] ). An "opportunistic scheme" that selects the user with the largest instantaneous gain maximizes the sum-rate of the system. The results in this section can be interpreted as an extension of opportunistic transmission in the presence of eavesdroppers.
Definition 6: A (n, 2 nR 1 , . . . , 2 nR K ) code consists of an encoding function from the messages w 1 , . . . , w K with w i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2 nR i } to transmitted symbols x(t) = ω t (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w K ; h t 1 , h t 2 , . . . , h t K ) for t = 1, 2, . . . , n, and a decoding function at each receiverŴ i = φ i (y
is achievable with perfect secrecy if, for any ε > 0, there exists a length n code such that, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , K, with W i uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , 2 nR i }, we have Pr(Ŵ i = W i ) ≤ ε and
The secrecy-sum-capacity is the supremum value of R 1 + R 2 + . . . + R K among all achievable rate tuples.
A. Main Results
In the following, let H max denote the largest instantaneous channel gain among the K users. We first upper and lower bound the secrecy-sum-capacity.
Lemma 6: For the channel model (40), the secrecy-sum-capacity is upper and lower bounded as
and
respectively, where {v} + denotes the max(0, v).
The difference in our lower and upper bounds in (50) and (51) is that the {·} + operator is inside the expectation in our upper bound but not in the lower bound. Thus the "loss" with respect to the upper bound occurs whenever |H max | 2 ≤ |H e | 2 . As the number of intended receivers grows this event happens rarely and the gap between the upper and lower bounds vanishes. Formally we have Theorem 4: The gap between our upper bound R + K (P ) and the lower bound R − K (P ) in Lemma 6 satisfies
The bounds coincide in the limit K → ∞ when all the channel gains are sampled from CN (0, 1).
The result of Theorem 4 shows that opportunistic transmission in conjunction with single user Gaussian codebooks achieves the optimal sum secrecy-rate in the limit of large number of receivers.
Remark 10: To the best of our knowledge, the secrecy-sum-capacity for a finite number of receivers has not been resolved for the fast fading model (40). When the coherence period is large enough so that one can invoke random coding arguments in each period, it appears possible to extend the single receiver result in [14] to determine the secrecy-sum-capacity for finite number of users. We elaborate this connection later in the section VII-F.
Our upper and lower bounds do not coincide for a finite number of users. Nevertheless, the high SNR limit provides a convenient operating regime for numerical evaluation of the bounds.
Corollary 3: We have
B. Upper Bound in Lemma 6
Our proof technique is to introduce a single user genie-aided channel as in Section IV and then to upper bound this single user channel. This upper bound on the genie aided channel is closely related to an upper bound provided in [14] for the slow fading channel. We nevertheless provide a complete derivation in Appendix IV.
C. Achievability in Lemma 6
The achievability scheme combines opportunistic transmission and a Gaussian wiretap code. At each time, only the message of the user with the best instantaneous channel gain is selected for transmission.
As in Section VI-B, we quantize each receiver's channel gain into q levels A 1 = 0 < A 2 < . . . < A q ≤ A q+1 = ∞. Since the channel gains of the K users are independent, there are a total of M = q K different super-states. These are denoted as S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S M . Each of the super-states denotes one parallel channel. Note that on each parallel channel, the intended users have a Gaussian channel, while the eavesdropper has a fading channel.
Our scheme transmits an independent message on each of the M parallel channels. Let G j ∈ {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A q } denote the gain of the strongest user on channel j. We use a Gaussian codebook with power P (G j ) on channel j. The achievable rate on channel j is
where the second equality follows from our choice of X j = U j ∼ N (0, P (G j )). The overall achievable sum rate is given by
where the last equality follows by using the fact that G j ∈ {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A q } and rewriting the summation over these indices. As q → ∞,
which establishes (51).
D. Proof of Theorem 4
Let P * (H max ) be the power allocation that maximizes R
where the first step follows substituting the bounds in 6, the third step follows from the fact that log
is increasing in a for |H e | 2 ≥ |H max | 2 , and where the last step follows from Lemma 8 (proved in the Appendix V) and the fact that Pr(|H e | 2 ≥ |H max | 2 ) = 1/(1 + K), since we assumed the channel coefficients to be i.i.d.
E. Proof of Corollary 3
The upper bound follows from the simple identity, that for every P ≥ 0,
For the lower bound, we use a two level power allocation strategy in (51). Fix a threshold T ≥ 0 and let This choice gives an achievable rate of
The argument inside the expectation is bounded by E[log |Hmax| 2
|He| 2 ] for all P 0 > 0. Hence by the dominated convergence theorem the limit P → ∞ and the expectation can be interchanged. Accordingly we have
which gives the desired result.
F. Discussion
Theorem 4 guarantees an arbitrarily small gap between upper and lower bounds on the sum-secrecycapacity, that holds for any fixed coherence period, provided the number of users is large enough.
In [14] two schemes are presented -a variable rate and a constant rate -for the case of a single receiver in slow fading environment. Straightforward extensions of these schemes for multiple receivers reveals the following. The variable rate scheme achieves the our upper bound in (50), whereas the constant rate scheme achieve our lower bound in (51). Since these two expressions coincide as the number of receivers tends to infinity, one deduces that the gains of variable rate schemes become negligible in this limit.
Numerical Evaluation of the Upper and Lower Bounds:
We plot the upper and lower bounds in the high SNR limit in (54) in Fig. 4 for the case of i.i.d. Rayleigh fading. Note that the bounds are quite close even for a moderate number of users.
Colluding Attacks: We noted earlier that any number of statistically equivalent eavesdroppers does not affect our capacity as long as they do not collude. If the eavesdroppers collude then they can combine the received signals and attempt to decode the message. The upper and lower bounds in Lemma 6 can be extended by replacing the term |H e | 2 with ||H e || 2 , where H e is the vector of channel gains of the colluding eavesdroppers. One conclusion from these bounds is that the secrecy capacity is positive unless the colluding eavesdropper population grows as log K.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A generalization of the wiretap channel to the case of parallel and fading channels with multiple receivers is considered. We established the common-message-secrecy-capacity for the case of reversely degraded parallel channels and provided upper and lower bounds for the general case. For independent messages over parallel channels, the sum-secrecy capacity has been determined. For fading channels, we examined a fast fading scenario when the transmitter knows the instantaneous channels of all the intended receivers but not of the eavesdropper. Interestingly, the common-message-secrecy-capacity does not decay to zero as the number of intended receiver grows. For the case of independent messages, it was shown that an opportunistic scheme achieves the secrecy-sum-capacity in the limit of large number of users.
The protocols investigated in this paper relied on time diversity (for the common message) and multiuser diversity (for independent messages) to enable secure communication. In situations where such forms of diversity is not available, it is of interest to develop a formulation for secure transmission, analogous to the outage formulation for slow fading channels. Secondly, the impact of multiple antennas on secure transmission is far from being clear at this stage. While multiple antennas can theoretically provide significant gains in throughput in the conventional systems, a theoretical analysis for the case of confidential messages is naturally of great interest. 
The following chain of inequalities can be verified.
Equation (59) is a consequence of the chain rule for mutual information. Equation (60) follows from the fact that T → X → (Y, Z) forms a Markov Chain, so that I(T ; Z|X) = I(T ; Y, Z|X) = 0.
APPENDIX II PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Since there are Q j = 2 nR ej codewords per message bin C j (W ) and each codeword is equally likely to be selected
where the last equality follows from the definition of R ej in (18) . Since the number of codewords in each bin is less than 2 n(I(U j ;Y ej )−ε F ) , we can select a code that satisfies Fano's inequality
The equivocation at the eavesdropper can be lower bounded as
Here (63) follows from substituting (62), (64) from the fact that W is deterministic given U n j and (65) follows by substituting (61). We now show that for a suitably chosen ε > 0
First note the following
Let J be an indicator function which equals 1 if (y
Now we can upper bound
where (69) follows from the fact that I(U Transmitter
Fig . 5 . Decomposition of the two user system into four states. In the first state both users have channel gains above the threshold. In the second state only user 1 has channel above the threshold while in the third state only user 2 has channel above the threshold. The fourth state both users have channels below the threshold. In any state, a user is colored dark if the channel gain is below the threshold and shaded if the channel gain is above the threshold.
APPENDIX III ALTERNATE SCHEME FOR THEOREM 3 We present an alternate scheme for Theorem 3. For simplicity we focus on the case of two receivers. The case of more than two receivers is analogous. Fix a threshold T > 0 and decompose the system into four states as shown in Fig. 5 . . The transmission happens over a block of length n and we classify t = 1, 2, . . . , n as S 1 = t ∈ {1, n} | |h 1 (t)| 2 ≥ T, |h 2 (t)| 2 ≥ T S 2 = t ∈ {1, n} | |h 1 (t)| 2 ≥ T, |h 2 (t)| 2 < T S 3 = t ∈ {1, n} | |h 1 (t)| 2 < T, |h 2 (t)| 2 ≥ T S 4 = t ∈ {1, n} | |h 1 (t)| 2 < T, |h 2 (t)| 2 < T .
The resulting channel is a probabilistic parallel channel with probabilities of the four channels as p(S 1 ) = Pr(|H 1 | 2 ≥ T, |H 2 | 2 ≥ T ), p(S 2 ) = Pr(|H 1 | 2 ≥ T, |H 2 | 2 < T ), p(S 3 ) = Pr(|H 1 | 2 < T, |H 2 | 2 ≥ T ) and p(S 4 ) = Pr(|H 1 | 2 < T, |H 2 | 2 < T ). Also note that with X j = U j ∼ CN (0, P ) in the argument of the summation in (44), 
where T * in (74) is the solution to log(1 + xP ) − E[log(1 + |H e | 2 P ] = 0. (The optimality of T * follows from the fact that p i (x) ≥ 0 and hence the integral is maximized by keeping all terms which are positive and discarding the negative terms, however this is not necessary to note as this is an achievable scheme.) Note that (75) coincides with the achievable rate in Theorem 3 for the case of K = 2 users. As remarked earlier, this scheme straightforwardly generalizes to more than two receivers. With K receivers we will have a total of 2 K states, where each state specifies the subset of users that are above the threshold T * .
APPENDIX IV PROOF OF THE UPPER BOUND IN LEMMA 6 Consider the channel with one receiver and one eavesdropper. Y (t) = H max (t)X(t) + Z(t) Y e (t) = H e (t)X(t) + Z e (t).
Along the lines of Lemma 4 in Section IV-B one deduces that the sum-secrecy-capacity of the channel (40) is upper bounded by the secrecy capacity of the genie-aided-channel (76). It remains to show that an upper bound on the secrecy capacity of this channel is R + (P ) = max P (Hmax):E[P (Hmax)]≤P E {log(1 + |H max | 2 P (H max )) − log(1 + |H e | 2 P (H max ))} + .
In what follows we will denote the eavesdropper's channel output byŶ e (t) = (Y e (t), H e (t)) and optimistically assume that the sequence H n max is known to the sender and the receiver non-causally. The joint distribution of the noise variables (Z(t), Z e (t)) is selected to be such that if |H e (t)| ≤ |H max (t)| we have X(t) → Y (t) → Y e (t), otherwise we have X(t) → Y e (t) → Y (t).
Suppose for this channel and the sequence H n max , there is a sequence of (n, 2 nR ) codes that achieve perfect secrecy in Definition 6. I(X(t); Y (t)|H max (t),Ŷ e (t)) + nε
where (78) follows from the fact that W → (X n ,Ŷ n e ) → Y n follows a Markov chain and (79) from the fact that the channel is memoryless.
Now let H n be the set of all fades that have been realized, i.e.,
let N γ denote the number of times in the interval [0, n] that the channel has fade γ, and let S γ denote the time indices corresponding to a fade γ, i.e., S γ = t | 1 ≤ t ≤ n, |H max (t)| 2 = γ γ ∈ H n .
Letting the average transmitted power at time t ∈ S γ be denoted as P n γ (t) we have
where the expectation is over the set of transmitted messages and any stochastic mapping used by the encoder. LetP 
